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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce patent litigation as a leading indicator of market 
growth. We model the intensity of patent litigation and the market growth for the 
personal computer and cellular phone market in the US. By means of these analytic 
models, we show that patent litigation is a leading indicator to market growth. We are 
also able to very precisely delineate discrete stages of the product’s market life cycle and 
demarcate the time when life-cycle transitions are about to take place. We close this 
paper with a discussion on new lines of patent research that are potentially useful for 
managerial practice and for investment decisions.  
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Introduction     
Patents have been used to analyze the diffusion of knowledge as a productive asset that 
creates economic growth [1-5]. Patent renewal information has been a line of research to 
determine its relationship to economic growth [6-9]. However, the visibility is thin 
regarding the nature of the mechanisms of knowledge flow. To address this void, a major 
line of research has been to investigate patent citations as a mechanism of knowledge 
spillover [10,11]. The literature demonstrates that there are linkages between patent 
activity and macroeconomic growth through citations across institutional and geographic 
boundaries [12-14].  
  The objective of this paper is to address such a direct link and discuss potential 
new research directions. We show that the intensity of patent litigation is an indicator to 
determine the timing and rate of market growth. Although patent litigation has a line of 
investigation [15,16], we are not aware of analysis that uses patent litigation as leading 
indicator to market growth. We use the personal computer (PC) and the cellular phone 
markets to test our hypothesis. Using measures of patent litigation intensity (PLI) and 
market growth, we are able to express their relationship in mathematical form and thus 
establish the linkage between patent litigation intensity and market growth. We will 
discuss the limitations of our analysis, as well as, new potential research to develop a 
unifying framework to connect patent activities to market growth. We close this paper 
with a discussion of the implications to managerial practice and to financial investments 
in new and emerging high technology markets.   
  The fundamental research challenge has been to identify parametric variables that 
link patent activity to market growth. Although research shows that patent citations is a 
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useful proxy to indicate that knowledge is being diffused, we seek a more direct indicator 
to link a specific class of patent activities to economic growth. In addition, patents are not 
always renewed [6-9]. Our line of thinking is motivated by our experience in high 
technology industry which tells us that patent citations are activities largely related to 
research and development, analysis of competitor capabilities, and acquisition of 
competitive knowledge. As such, they are more indicative of future expectations of 
growth, rather than of conviction that growth is imminent, present, or in active progress. 
Furthermore, citation research is grounded on the presumption that once knowledge is 
acquired, spillover has begun, and therefore market growth will follow. Recent research 
shows that citation data is not always accurate [17]. Jaffe, et al., 2000, cite: 
“There is however a large amount of noise in citations data; it appears  
that something like one half of all citations do not correspond to any  
perceived communication, or even necessarily to a perceptible  
technological relationship between the inventions.”    
Our hypothesis is that the intensity of patent litigation is a promising indicator of market 
growth. We believe that patent litigation engages the attention and commitment of the 
firm precisely because its economic interests are at stake and because litigation is costly. 
The average cost for each patent lawsuit is more than $1 million [18]. As such, unlike 
other patent activity, patent litigation is no longer merely planning, research, or analysis. 
It is a shot across the bow to warn an adversary. It is a strong signal that the firm’s 
significant economic interests are at stake and that the firm is committed to spend 
management time and litigation expenses to defend its markets. Patent litigation engages 
the attention of senior executives of the firm because they have judged that market 
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growth is emerging, imminent, or visible to the firm. Consider other sides of the litigation 
issue. Intentional patent infringement clearly indicates that the infringing firm has a 
strong belief that there is a nontrivial market share it wants to capture, albeit by illicit 
means. On the other hand, innocent infringement of existing patents can be interpreted as 
technology reaching a level of maturity. Ideas are now more common and widely 
diffused because market growth is either imminent or in progress.  
PLI and Market Data for the PC Market 
Using public data about the PC industry, we collected information of the market size in 
the US, measured in $, from 1970 to the present, 2000. Table 1 shows these data. Next, 
we collected patent litigation activity of key PC firms from for the same time interval 
[19]. We examined the patent litigation activities from these key firms in the PC industry 
and discarded those we considered not germane to our analysis. Our analysis included 
firms like Intel, AMD, Texas Instruments, Cypress Semiconductor, Tandy, Cyrix, and 
NEC. We found a total of 46 relevant suits covering the period under consideration. This 
is shown in Table 2.  
PLI and PC Industry Models 
Using the data from Table 1 and by means of regression analysis, the market growth of 
the PC industry measured in sales $, is expressed by:   
bTa
mPC
e
RR
−−+
=
1
                             (1)                                
RPC is the PC industry revenue curve in monetary units plotted against time as the 
independent variable. Rm is the ultimate industry revenue when we expect the market to 
be saturated. The coefficients, a and b, are obtained from the regression.  The variable T 
is time, which is measured in years. Note that equation (1) takes the form of the logistics 
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curve. In equation (1), we have: Rm=$180,000 million, a = 402.83069, b = 0.20151339 
and R2 = 0.986. This is illustrated below in Figure 1.   
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Intuitively, the rate of the rise of the PLI curve is indicative of the increasing intensity of 
the patent litigation. Using the same regression approach, we can express the PLI curve in 
the following form:  
dTc
mPC
e
LL
−−+
=
1
            (2) 
LPC is the litigation intensity function for the PC market. Lm is the maximum level 
of litigation intensity. We obtain the coefficients c and d from a regression analysis. The 
independent variable T is time, which we measure in years. In equation (2), we have 
Lm=70, and obtained c = 405.93918, d = 0.20335124, with R
2 = 0.961. 
We plot the functions d2RPC/dt2 and d2LPC/dt2 as shown in Figure 3.  There are 
three points of specific interest in our analysis: 
T1 where d
2LPC/dt2= maximum at year 1989.8,  
T2 where d
2RPC/dt2= maximum at year 1992.5, and  
T3 where d
2RPC/dt2= 0 at year 1999.0.  
           We can now segment, with some precision, the PC market life cycle into 4 distinct 
segments: T≤T1, T1 < T<T2, T2<T<T3 and T≥T3 as shown in Figure 3. We show the PLI 
and the market growth function in Figure 4 with the life-cycle segments delineated by the 
time periods in discussion where T1=1989.8, T2=1992.5 and T3=1999.0   
We call the time period T≤T1, the period of “market establishment.” This is the 
time when the first movers try to establish their position in the market. In order to protect 
their investments that helped create this market, firms defend their exclusive rights to 
innovation by litigation where they are convinced their business interests are being 
violated. At this time litigation is intense and accelerating driven by their belief that the 
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market is about to take off. Evidence of market growth helps to strengthen that 
conviction. In addition, firms use patents as weapons to defend their markets or as 
instruments to “hem in” in markets led by others [20, 21]. This is a particularly common 
business practice before the take off stage of new markets. However, eventually litigation 
intensity slows down to the point where its acceleration reaches a maximum at time T1. 
 
 
 The time between T1 and T2 is when litigation is decelerating, but when market 
revenue are continuously growing and accelerating until it reaches at point T2, indicating 
that the risks are now lower than before.  Therefore, we call this time the “window of 
opportunity”.  We interpret this period as the time when business executives have 
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determined that knowledge spillover has already taken place and that it is no longer 
productive to engage in costly patent litigation. The “window of opportunity” is the 
optimum time for fast-followers to enter the market because the market is growing most 
rapidly. This is also the time for conservative and risk-averse investors to commit funds 
in new ventures. However, they should be prepared to face increasingly intensive 
competition.  
 
 
 
The time T, T2<T<T3, we call the “market maturation” period. This is the time 
when there is steady market growth, albeit, at a decelerating pace until the acceleration of 
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market revenue reaches zero at time T3, i.e., where d
2RPC/dt2= 0.  Typically late 
followers enter the market at this time, when the risk is lowest and when the acceleration 
has already peaked. No acceleration means that the growth is beginning to decline. This 
is an indicator of market maturation. Consequently the time T≧T3 we call the period of 
“market saturation.”   
According to our analysis, we note that the “window of opportunity” for the PC 
market is between 1989.8 and 1992.5, a time interval of 2.7 years. The “market 
maturation” period is between 1992.5 and 1999.0, a time interval of 6.5 years. These time 
intervals are consistent with our intuition and historical development. According to IDG, 
the US PC market will reach saturation in 2001. The PC established itself in the market 
rapidly and created for itself a long lasting market period to the point where it is now 
widely adopted in virtually every walk of life. (Note that is important to carry out the 
years to one decimal place. In a fast moving business like high technology months can 
mean the difference between a profitable or a non-profitable quarter.)  
Data and Model for the Cellular Phone Industry 
In the US, Motorola has been the key creator, innovator and driver of the cellular phone 
market. Relative to the PC market, the cellular phone business is younger, which is the 
reason why we collected Motorola’s patent litigation activity from 1975 up to the present, 
2000. Consequently, whereas in the case of the PC we had 30 years of data, for the cellular 
phone market we have only have a track of 25 years. Table 4 shows details of the litigation 
intensity for the cellular phone market. Next we collected information of the US market 
size, measured in terms of total subscribers, for the same period of time, illustrated in Table 
3.  
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We plot the data from Table 3 and a regression, the market growth of cellular 
phone is expressed by:   
               kTh
mCP
e
SS
−−+
=
1
 (5)                                 
where Sm=170 million, h=817.69779, k=0.40901375, and R2=0.99. The interpretation of 
this equation is analogous to (1).  And as in the previous example of the PC market, we 
plot the data from Table 4 as a function of time. This is the PLI curve for the cellular 
phone market. The mathematical expression of that is:  
   gTf
mCP
e
LL
−−+
=
1
           (6) 
where Lm=70, f=333.11908, g=1.66852027, with R2=0.94. We combine the PLI curve 
and the market growth curve of the cellular phone market in Figure 5.   
As in the PC market, we now segment the cellular phone market life-cycle into 4 
distinct segments: T≦T1, T1<T<T2, T2<T<T3 and T≧T3 as shown in Figure 5. We show 
the PLI and the market growth function in Figure 5 with the life-cycle segments 
delineated by the time periods in discussion where T1=1988.6, T2=1996.5 and T3=1999.2.   
Note that in this case the “window of opportunity” is 7.9 years. Recall that this is longer 
than PC market. We interpret this to mean that the patent litigation activity started earlier 
in the market life cycle because firms recognized the promise of the cellular phone 
market. Note that its maturation period is much shorter. Once people started to become 
comfortable communicating with cellular phones, it became widely accepted very 
quickly. The interpretation and discussion of the business implications follow similar 
lines, which have already been discussed in the section for the PC market.  
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Discussion 
In this paper we have presented analysis for two markets to show that patent litigation 
intensity (PLI) is a useful indicator of market growth. Patent citation analysis has been a 
fruitful arena of research using a specific patent activity to demonstrate that knowledge 
diffuses into the economy to subsequently create economic growth. We have shown the 
existence of another specific patent activity, patent litigation, as a more direct indicator of 
market growth.  
We have argued that patent citations are indicative of research, learning and 
expectations of market growth. In contrast, patent litigation is more akin to a declaration 
of war motivated by unambiguous commitment and a clear conviction that the firm’s 
economic interests are being violated. As such PLI is a more direct indicator of market 
growth than other patent activities. We believe that this kind of patent analysis offers new 
avenues of research. For example, we are analyzing software copyright violations to 
determine its effectiveness as an indicator of market growth. Theoretical economic 
research suggests that this may be case [22].  
Pursuing this line of thinking further, we propose that patent activity analysis be 
partitioned into three classes of activities, 1) completely legal activities such as patent 
citations and licensing, 2) disputed activities such as patent infringements, patent 
litigation and reverse engineering, and 3) illegal patent activities, such as theft of patent 
embodiments. This suggests that it would be useful to develop an integrated framework 
that combines a closed of patent activities L={li, i=1,…,n, n>0}, D={dj, j=1,…,m, m>0}, 
P={k, k=1,…,r, r>0}, such that 1) LΥDΥ P={patent activities}z,  where z≤n+m+r, 
L Ι D=∅, L Ι P=∅, D Ι P=∅, and 2) the elements spanning each set are orthogonal and 
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complete. We claim that, at least, L admits l1=patent citations and D admits d1=patent 
litigation, and set P admits p1=piracy.  
We are currently engaged in efforts to combine patent citations and patent 
litigation as first step to determine whether we can find an equation for market growth of 
the form ψ=ψ(L,D,P,T) where T is time.  
It is appropriate to point out some limitations of our model. We have applied our 
patent litigation analysis to new markets prior to its take-off stage in only two markets in 
the US. Extending this analysis to other technology intensive markets in, such as 
bioengineering, and pharmaceuticals, will shed more light on the timing of market take-
off. Research shows that technology moves in waves, i.e., new S-curves ride on top of 
maturing S-curves [23, 24]. It is reasonable to expect that market growth when 
approaching its asymptote, will move additively on a new S-curve spurred by new 
technology. We also did not consider the resolution of litigation. The number of suits 
does not reach an asymptotic level and remain at that level. At some point while the PLI 
approaches its asymptote, PLI should begin to attenuate rapidly as dominant technologies 
assert themselves in the market.  The point at which this occurs relative to the market 
growth curve is another area that merits further investigation.       
In spite of its embryonic form, we believe that PLI is a potentially useful indicator 
to investors in new technology-intensive markets and industries. For venture capitalists, 
angels, or other investors, PLI can serve as additional confirmation to other indicators 
they may use. For example, a financial investment firm seeking to commit funds to a new 
business venture may want to adopt PLI as an indicator in its risk analysis.   
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  Table 1. PC Market Revenues   
              1980-2000 
Year Annual Sale $m 
1980           1,550  
1981           2,550  
1982           4,390  
1983           7,470  
1984          11,940  
1985          13,040  
1986          13,940  
1987          14,881  
1988          17,147  
1989          20,707  
1990          23,584  
1991          24,269  
1992          30,833  
1993          40,985  
1994       46,052 
1995          53,706  
1996          61,008  
1997          70,090  
1998          78,240  
1999          88,440  
2000          99,700  
(Source:  Information Technology  
Industry Data Book) 
      Table 2. PC Industry Patent   
        Litigation Intensity (PLI) 
   Year 
Patent 
Litigation 
1970 0 
1971 0 
1972 1 
1973 0 
1974 0 
1975 0 
1976 0 
1977 0 
1978 1 
1979 0 
1980 1 
1981 0 
1982 0 
1983 0 
1984 0 
1985 0 
1986 1 
1987 2 
1988 4 
1989 4 
1990 2 
1991 2 
1992 4 
1993 6 
1994 1 
1995 1 
1996 4 
1997 1 
1998 3 
1999 6 
2000 2 
     (Source: http://web.lexis-nexis.com/) 
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  Table 3. US Cellular Phone 
     Subscribers 1985-2000 
Year Subscribers 
1985                   203,600  
1986                   500,000  
1987                   883,778  
1988                1,608,697  
1989                2,691,793  
1990                4,368,686  
1991                6,380,053  
1992                8,892,535  
1993              13,067,318  
1994              19,283,306  
1995              28,154,446  
1996              38,411,446  
1997              49,680,446  
1998              63,577,446  
1999              80,000,000  
(Source: Strategy Research Division) 
 
 
Table 4. Patent Litigation 
Intensity (PLI) of US Cellular 
Phone Market 1985-2000 
Year 
Patent 
Lawsuits
1975 1 
1976 1 
1977 0 
1978 0 
1979 0 
1980 4 
1981 1 
1982 0 
1983 0 
1984 4 
1985 2 
1986 1 
1987 2 
1988 1 
1989 1 
1990 3 
1991 2 
1992 0 
1993 0 
1994 2 
1995 1 
1996 2 
1997 7 
1998 2 
1999 2 
2000 3 
 (Source: http://web.lexis-nexis.com/) 
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